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Abstract
We study the competition of two strategic agents for liquidity in the
benchmark portfolio tracking setup of Bank et al. [5], both facing com-
mon aggregated temporary and permanent price impact a` la Almgren
and Chriss [2]. The resulting stochastic linear quadratic differential
game with terminal state constraints allows for an explicitly available
open-loop Nash equilibrium in feedback form. Our results reveal how
the equilibrium strategies of the two players take into account the
other agent’s trading targets: either in an exploitative intent or by
providing liquidity to the competitor, depending on the ratio between
temporary and permanent price impact. As a consequence, different
behavioral patterns can emerge as optimal in equilibrium. These in-
sights complement existing studies in the literature on predatory trad-
ing models examined in the context of optimal portfolio liquidation
problems.
Mathematical Subject Classification (2010): 91A15, 91A23, 91G80,
49N10, 60H30
JEL Classification: C61, C73, G11
Keywords: stochastic differential game, Nash equilibrium, illiquid markets,
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1 Introduction
The confrontation of financial agents concurrently trading in a single risky
asset and adversely affecting its execution price through common aggregated
temporary and permanent price impact is a well-known problem in optimal
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portfolio liquidation. Indeed, when a possibly financially distressed institu-
tional investor aims to liquidate a large portfolio position in a risky asset,
another strategic trader’s awareness of the investor’s intentions might tempt
her to also trade in the risky asset in order to benefit from the incurred price
impact. Typically, one might expect a predatory trading activity: Like a
prey the distressed investor is raced to the market by a predator who ini-
tially trades in parallel in the same direction solely to unwind her accrued
position eventually at more favorable prices due to the induced price impact,
and at the expense of the liquidating investor. But, is it also conceivable
to observe a converse behaviour where an agent actually cooperates and pro-
vides liquidity by buying some of the seller’s shares – or even engages in both
occasional predation as well as cooperation? Among the first game theoretic
approaches carried out to formulate and investigate possible phenomena in
this context of portfolio liquidation are, e.g., Brunnermeier and Pedersen [6],
Attari et al. [4], Carlin et al. [8], Scho¨neborn [22], Scho¨neborn and Schied
[23], Carmona and Yang [9], and Schied and Zhang [19].
Our goal in this paper is to expand these works and to address above ques-
tion by studying the competition of two strategic agents for liquidity when
both agents are trading simultaneously in an illiquid risky asset affected by
price impact because each agent seeks to track her own exogenously given
stochastic target strategy like, e.g., a frictionless delta hedge to dynamically
hedge the fluctuations of their random endowments. Specifically, we extend
the single-player cost optimal benchmark portfolio tracking problem studied
in Bank et al. [5] in the presence of temporary and permanent price impact
as proposed by Almgren and Chriss [2] to a two-player stochastic differential
game. Both strategic agents are fully aware of the opponent’s individual
tracking objectives and they compete for available liquidity as the jointly
caused price impact on the execution price directly feeds into their trading
performances. We also allow for individual stochastic terminal state con-
straints on each agent’s final portfolio position. Our aim is to shed light on
the strategic interplay between the agents and to make transparent how each
agent takes into account the other agent’s trading targets in an optimal cost
minimizing manner by solving for a Nash equilibrium in this two-player price
impact game.
The paper most closely related to ours is Schied and Zhang [19]. Therein
the authors determine a unique open-loop Nash equilibrium within the class
of deterministic strategies of agents aiming to liquidate a given asset posi-
tion by maximizing a mean-variance criterion in an Almgren and Chriss [2]
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framework. Their study is an extension of the corresponding deterministic
differential game solved in Carlin et al. [8] of liquidating risk-neutral agents
who maximize expected revenues. Other extensions of the latter game in-
clude, e.g., Scho¨neborn and Schied [23] and Carmona and Yang [9]: Both
consider a two-stage version of the model in Carlin et al. [8] by allowing for
different time horizons among the agents. While Scho¨neborn and Schied [23]
investigate the qualitative behaviour of the resulting deterministic open-loop
Nash equilibrium, Carmona and Yang [9] numerically analyze closed-loop
Nash equilibrium strategies; see also Moallemi et al. [17] for an extension of
the differential game in [8] with asymmetric information, or to the case of
multiple assets in Chu et al. [12]. By contrast to these papers, we addition-
ally allow the agents to track their own general predictable target strategies
as in the single-player case investigated in [5]. Facing the same time horizon,
the players’ terminal portfolio positions are also restricted to some exoge-
nously predetermined stochastic levels which reveal gradually over time. As
a consequence, both agents will choose their dynamic trading strategies from
a suitable set of adapted stochastic processes rather than opting for static
strategies from a set of deterministic functions as in the papers cited above
(except for the numerical study in Carmona and Yang [9]). Other recent
work on price impact games with Almgren-Chriss type price impact include,
e.g., Huang et al. [16], Casgrain and Jaimungal [10, 11] where agents pur-
sue optimal liquidation or trading and interact through common aggregated
permanent price impact; Ekren and Nadtochiy [14] describe an equilibrium
between competing market makers with constant absolute risk aversion who
are intertwined through jointly incurred temporary price impact while hedg-
ing fractions of the same European option in a Markovian framework. Price
impact games of liquidating agents in a market model with transient price
impact are analyzed, e.g., in Schied and Zhang [20], Schied et al. [21], and
Strehle [24].
Our main result is an explicit description of a unique open-loop Nash
equilibrium in feedback form within the class of progressively measurable
strategies to our two-player stochastic differential game where both agents
track their own target strategies as in [5] and interact through temporary
and permanent price impact as in [19] and [8]. Mathematically, we solve a
symmetric linear quadratic stochastic differential game with random state
constraints. Inspired by the analysis in [5], we follow a probabilistic and
convex-analytic approach in the style of Pontryagin’s stochastic maximum
principle. This also allows us to consider general predictable strategies as
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the agents’ tracking targets and not necessarily Markovian or continuous
diffusion-type processes. We derive a characterization of the Nash equilib-
rium which takes the form of a coupled system of linear forward-backward
stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs). Solving this system provides us
with the agents’ optimal trading strategies in equilibrium in closed-form and
unveils a rich phenomenology for their optimal behaviour.
It turns out that in equilibrium, similar to the single-player solution pre-
sented in [5], both agents anticipate their individual running target portfolio
by gradually trading in the direction of a weighted average of expected fu-
ture target positions of the target strategy. However, being aware of the
competitor’s tracking goals, each agent also assesses a weighted average of
the expected future positions of the opponent’s target strategy and chooses to
trade accordingly. Interestingly, it arises that the agents’ trading directions
with respect to the adversary’s target strategy is not invariant but depends
on the relation between temporary and permanent price impact. Indeed, as
it becomes apparent from our explicit solution both predation by simultane-
ously trading in the same direction as the opponent, as well as cooperation
by trading in the opposite direction can occur, even in a coexisting manner.
As a consequence, different behavioral paradigms can emerge as optimal in
our Nash equilibrium.
Conceptually, our explicit results elaborate on the analysis carried out
by Scho¨neborn and Schied [23]. Therein the authors identify two distinct
types of illiquid markets: A plastic market where the price impact is predom-
inantly permanent, and an elastic market where the major part of incurred
price impact is temporary. Their model predicts that a competitor who is
conscious of the other agent’s liquidation intention engages in predatory trad-
ing in a plastic market, while she tends to cooperate and provides liquidity
in an elastic market. Our closed-form Nash equilibrium solution of our more
general price impact game corroborates this. The novelty of our contribution
comes from the fact that in our game setup even though both agents share
the same time horizon the various behavioral patterns of coexisting liquidity
provision as well as preying in equilibrium arise due to the agents’ tracking
objectives which incorporate a risk aversion in form of an inventory risk. In
fact, this is also already suggested by the deterministic Nash equilibrium for
mean-variance optimal liquidation in Schied and Zhang [19]. In contrast, the
agents in the differential game in Scho¨neborn and Schied [23] are risk-neutral
and cooperation among them is facilitated by introducing a two-stage setup
where the agents have different time horizons. Indeed, in the correspond-
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ing one-stage game from Carlin et al. [8] with same time constraint for all
agents only predation in equilibrium is observed and cooperation can only
be enforced by repeating the game.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we intro-
duce our two-player stochastic differential price impact game by extending
the framework of Carlin et al. [8] and Schied and Zhang [19] to a stochastic
tracking problem of general predictable target strategies. Our main result,
an explicit description of a unique open-loop Nash equilibrium of the game is
presented in Section 3. Section 4 contains some illustrations and discusses the
qualitative behaviour of the two players’ optimal strategies in equilibrium.
The technical proofs are deferred to Section 5.
Notation: Throughout this manuscript we use superscripts for enumer-
ating purposes as, e.g., in X1, X2, α1, α2, or other quantities like ξ1, ξ2 etc.
to mark all objects which are associated with player 1 and player 2, respec-
tively; or, to itemize objects as w1, w2, w3 etc. In particular, X2, α2, ξ2 is
not to be confused with quadratic powers, which will be explicitly denoted
with brackets like (α)2, or, if necessary, as (α2)2.
2 Problem formulation
Let T > 0 denote a finite deterministic time horizon and fix a filtered proba-
bility space (Ω,F , (Ft)0≤t≤T ,P) satisfying the usual conditions of right con-
tinuity and completeness. We consider two agents who are trading in a finan-
cial market consisting of one risky asset, e.g., a stock. The number of shares
agent 1 and agent 2 are holding at time t ∈ [0, T ] are defined, respectively,
as
X1t , x1 +
∫ t
0
α1sds and X
2
t , x2 +
∫ t
0
α2sds (1)
with initial positions x1, x2 ∈ R. The real-valued stochastic processes (α1t )0≤t≤T
and (α2t )0≤t≤T represent the turnover rate at which each agent trades in the
risky asset and belong to the admissibility set
A ,
{
α : α progressively measurable s.t. E
[∫ T
0
(αt)
2dt
]
<∞
}
. (2)
We adopt the framework from Carlin et al. [8] and Schied and Zhang [19]
and suppose that the agents’ trading incurs linear temporary and permanent
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price impact a` la Almgren and Chriss [2] in the sense that trades in the risky
asset are executed at prices
St , Pt + λ(α1t + α2t ) + γ((X1t − x1) + (X2t − x2)) (0 ≤ t ≤ T ) (3)
with some unaffected price process P· = P0 +
√
σW· following a Brownian
motion (Wt)0≤t≤T with variance σ > 0. The trading of both agents in the
risky asset consumes available liquidity and instantaneously affects the ex-
ecution price in (3) in an adverse manner through temporary price impact
λ > 0. In addition, the agents’ total accumulated trading activity also leaves
a trace in the execution price which is captured by the permanent price
impact parameter γ > 0.
Similar to the single-agent setup in Bank et al. [5] we assume that agent 1
and agent 2 are trading in this illiquid risky asset because each agent seeks
to track her own exogenously given target strategy (ξ1t )0≤t≤T and (ξ
2
t )0≤t≤T ,
respectively. Both processes ξ1 and ξ2 are supposed to be real-valued pre-
dictable processes in L2(P⊗dt) and can be thought of, for instance, as hedging
strategies adopted from a frictionless market. Moreover, the agents are also
required to reach a predetermined terminal portfolio target position Ξ1T and
Ξ2T in L
2(P,FT ) at time T . Mathematically, we can formalize their objec-
tives as follows: For a given strategy (α2t )0≤t≤T of her competitor agent 2,
agent 1 aims to choose her trading rate (α1t )0≤t≤T in order to minimize the
cost functional
J1(α1, α2) , E
[
1
2
∫ T
0
(X1t − ξ1t )2σdt
+
1
2
λ
∫ T
0
α1t
(
α1t + α
2
t
)
dt+ γ
∫ T
0
α1t
(
X2t − x2
)
dt
]
,
(4)
whereas agent 2 wishes to minimize
J2(α1, α2) , E
[
1
2
∫ T
0
(X2t − ξ2t )2σdt
+
1
2
λ
∫ T
0
α2t
(
α1t + α
2
t
)
dt+ γ
∫ T
0
α2t
(
X1t − x1
)
dt
] (5)
via her trading rate (α2t )0≤t≤T in response to a given strategy (α
1
t )0≤t≤T of
her opponent agent 1. As in the single-agent problem in Bank et al. [5], the
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first term in (4) and (5) reflects the agents’ running after their individual tar-
get strategies ξ1 and ξ2, respectively, through minimizing the corresponding
square deviation from their respective portfolio positions X1 and X2. The
common weight parameter σ measures price fluctuations of the underlying
unaffected price process. The second and third terms in (4) and (5) take into
account the additional incurred linear quadratic illiquidity costs which are in-
duced by temporary and permanent price impact while both agents are trad-
ing in the risky asset as stipulated in (3) (see also Carlin et al. [8] and Schied
and Zhang [19]). Note, however, that due to each agent’s individual terminal
state constraint X iT = Ξ
i
T P-a.s. (for i = 1, 2) only the competitor’s accrued
permanent price impact feeds into their respective cost functional. Indeed,
integration by parts yields that the i-th agent’s permanent impact from her
own trading always creates the same costs γ(X iT − xi)2 = γ(ΞiT − xi)2 in-
dependent of her chosen trading rate and therefore can be neglected in her
own objective functional. We obtain following individual optimal stochastic
control problems for agent 1 and agent 2, namely,
J1(α1, α2)→ min
α1∈A 1
(6)
for any fixed strategy α2 ∈ A 2, and
J2(α1, α2)→ min
α2∈A 2
, (7)
for any fixed strategy α1 ∈ A 1, where A i, i = 1, 2, is the set of constraint
policies defined as
A i ,
{
αi : αi ∈ A satisfying X iT = xi +
∫ T
0
αitdt = Ξ
i
T P-a.s.
}
. (8)
As in Bank et al. [5] we further assume that the target positions Ξ1T ,Ξ
2
T ∈
L2(P,FT ) satisfy
E
[∫ T
0
1
T − sd〈M
+〉s
]
<∞ and E
[∫ T
0
1
T − sd〈M
−〉s
]
<∞, (9)
where M+t , E[Ξ1T + Ξ2T |Ft] and M−t , E[Ξ1T − Ξ2T |Ft] for 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
Remark 2.1. 1. Similar to Carlin et al. [8] and Schied and Zhang [19] the
agent’s individual optimization problems in (6) and (7) are intertwined
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through common aggregated temporary and permanent price impact
affecting their performance functionals J1 and J2 in (4) and (5) (in
contrast to, e.g, Huang et al. [16], Casgrain and Jaimungal [10, 11] or
Ekren and Nadtochiy [14] where agents only interact through perma-
nent or temporary price impact, respectively). One can think of both
players as strategic agents who compete for liquidity while concurrently
trading in a single illiquid risky asset to meet their tracking objectives
for the purpose of, e.g., hedging fluctuations of random endowments.
Note that both agents are fully aware of the opponent’s trading tar-
gets ξi and ΞiT (i = 1, 2), as well as the jointly caused price impact
on the execution prices in (3). That is, our game is one of complete
information as in the related studies in Brunnermeier and Pedersen
[6], Carlin et al. [8], Scho¨neborn and Schied [23], Carmona and Yang
[9], and Schied and Zhang [19].
2. For further motivation for the tracking cost functionals in (4) and (5) we
refer to the single-player optimization problems studied, e.g., in Rogers
and Singh [18], Almgren and Li [3], Bank et al. [5], and Cai et al. [7].
Observe that the square tracking error also incorporates a risk aversion
on each player’s inventory. In this regard, both agents are homogeneous
in their inventory risk. Allowing for different risk aversion parameters
as, e.g., in Herdegen et al. [15], is conceivable but beyond the scope of
the present study. Indeed, in light of the analysis in Schied and Zhang
[19] we expect that this asymmetry rules out a closed-form solution for
the stochastic differential game, which is our primary focus of interest.
3. Analog to the study in Bank et al. [5] the assumption in (9) will ensure
that A i 6= ∅ for i = 1, 2 (cf. also the proof of Theorem 3.1 in Section 5
below). In fact, for given random variables ΞiT ∈ L2(P,FT ) only known
at time T the terminal state constraint X iT = Ξ
i
T P-a.s. (i = 1, 2) is
quite demanding. Thus, loosely speaking, the condition in (9) requires
that the speed at which information on the random ultimate target
positions Ξ1T , Ξ
2
T is revealed as t ↑ T is sufficiently fast.
Our goal is to compute a Nash equilibrium in which both agents solve
their minimization problems in (6) and (7) simultaneously, given the strategy
of her competitor, in the following sense:
Definition 2.2. A pair of admissible strategies (αˆ1, αˆ2) ∈ A 1×A 2 is called
an open-loop Nash equilibrium if for all admissible strategies α1 ∈ A 1 and
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α2 ∈ A 2 it holds that
J1(αˆ1, αˆ2) ≤ J1(α1, αˆ2) and J2(αˆ1, αˆ2) ≤ J2(αˆ1, α2).
In other words, in a Nash equilibrium neither player has an incentive to
deviate from the chosen strategy.
Remark 2.3.
1. In the special case of optimally liquidating the agents’ initial risky asset
holdings x1, x2 ∈ R without tracking exogenously given target strate-
gies, i.e., ξ1 ≡ ξ2 ≡ 0, and with non-random terminal target positions
Ξ1T = Ξ
2
T = 0 P-almost surely, the above formulated two-player (deter-
ministic) differential game is solved in Carlin et al. [8] setting σ = 0 in
the performance functionals in (4) and (5), and in Schied and Zhang
[19] allowing for σ > 0 instead. In both studies, the authors obtain
a unique open-loop Nash equilibrium in the sense of Definition 2.2 in
closed form within the class of deterministic strategies.
2. Two-stage extensions of the model in Carlin et al. [8] with risk-neutral
agents, i.e., σ = 0 in (4) and (5), are studied, e.g., in Scho¨neborn and
Schied [23], and Carmona and Yang [9] by allowing for different time
horizons between both agents. The former determines a unique de-
terministic open-loop Nash equilibrium whereas the latter numerically
analyzes a closed-loop Nash equilibrium.
3 Main result
Our main result is an explicit description of a unique open-loop Nash equi-
librium in the sense of Definition 2.2 of the two-player stochastic differential
game formulated in Section 2. To state our result it is convenient to introduce
following nonnegative constants
δ+ , γ2 + 6λσ, δ− , γ2 + 2λσ, (10)
the nonnegative functions
c+t ,
1
3
√
δ+ coth(
√
δ+(T − t)/(3λ)) + 1
3
γ,
c−t ,
√
δ− coth(
√
δ−(T − t)/λ)− γ
(0 ≤ t ≤ T ) (11)
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such that limt↑T c±t = +∞, as well as the weight functions
w1t ,
√
δ+ e
γ
3λ
(T−t)
3(c+t + c
−
t ) sinh(
√
δ+(T − t)/(3λ)) ,
w2t ,
√
δ− e−
γ
λ
(T−t)
(c+t + c
−
t ) sinh(
√
δ−(T − t)/λ) ,
w3t ,
c+t
c+t + c
−
t
− w1t , w4t ,
c−t
c+t + c
−
t
− w2t , w5t ,
c+t − c−t
c+t + c
−
t
(12)
for all t ∈ [0, T ]. We are now ready to state our main theorem:
Theorem 3.1. There exists a unique open-loop Nash equilibrium (αˆ1, αˆ2) in
A 1×A 2 in the sense of Definition 2.2. The corresponding equilibrium stock
holdings Xˆ1· = x
1 +
∫ ·
0
αˆ1tdt of agent 1 and Xˆ
2
· = x
2 +
∫ ·
0
αˆ2tdt of agent 2
satisfy the random linear coupled ODE
Xˆ10 = x
1, dXˆ1t =
c+t + c
−
t
2λ
(
ξˆ1t − w5t Xˆ2t − Xˆ1t
)
dt,
Xˆ20 = x
2, dXˆ2t =
c+t + c
−
t
2λ
(
ξˆ2t − w5t Xˆ1t − Xˆ2t
)
dt
(0 ≤ t < T ), (13)
where, for 0 ≤ t ≤ T , we let
ξˆ1t , w1t · E[Ξ1T + Ξ2T |Ft] + w2t · E[Ξ1T − Ξ2T |Ft]
+ w3t · E
[∫ T
t
(ξ1u + ξ
2
u) ·K1(t, u) du
∣∣∣Ft]
+ w4t · E
[∫ T
t
(ξ1u − ξ2u) ·K2(t, u) du
∣∣∣Ft]
(14)
and
ξˆ2t , w1t · E[Ξ2T + Ξ1T |Ft] + w2t · E[Ξ2T − Ξ1T |Ft]
+ w3t · E
[∫ T
t
(ξ2u + ξ
1
u) ·K1(t, u) du
∣∣∣Ft]
+ w4t · E
[∫ T
t
(ξ2u − ξ1u) ·K2(t, u) du
∣∣∣Ft]
(15)
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with nonnegative kernels
K1(t, u) , w
1
t
w3t
2σe−
γ
3λ
(T−u) sinh(
√
δ+(T − u)/(3λ))√
δ+
,
K2(t, u) , w
2
t
w4t
2σe
γ
λ
(T−u) sinh(
√
δ−(T − u)/λ)√
δ−
(0 ≤ t ≤ u < T ) (16)
which, for each t ∈ [0, T ), integrate to one over [t, T ]. The solution (Xˆ1, Xˆ2)
of (13) satisfies the terminal state constraints in the sense that
lim
t↑T
Xˆ1t = Ξ
1
T and lim
t↑T
Xˆ2t = Ξ
2
T P-a.s. (17)
The proof of Theorem 3.1 is deferred to Section 5. The equilibrium stock
holdings prescribed by the linear coupled ODE in (13) can be easily computed
explicitly.
Corollary 3.2. The solution (Xˆ1, Xˆ2) to the linear ODE in (13) is given by
Xˆ1t =
1
2
(x1 + x2)e−
∫ t
0
c+s
λ
ds +
1
4λ
∫ t
0
(c+s + c
−
s )(ξˆ
1
s + ξˆ
2
s )e
− ∫ ts c+uλ duds
+
1
2
(x1 − x2)e−
∫ t
0
c−s
λ
ds +
1
4λ
∫ t
0
(c+s + c
−
s )(ξˆ
1
s − ξˆ2s )e−
∫ t
s
c−u
λ
duds (18)
and, similarly, by
Xˆ2t =
1
2
(x2 + x1)e−
∫ t
0
c+s
λ
ds +
1
4λ
∫ t
0
(c+s + c
−
s )(ξˆ
2
s + ξˆ
1
s )e
− ∫ ts c+uλ duds
+
1
2
(x2 − x1)e−
∫ t
0
c−s
λ
ds +
1
4λ
∫ t
0
(c+s + c
−
s )(ξˆ
2
s − ξˆ1s )e−
∫ t
s
c−u
λ
duds (19)
for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Remark 3.3. Following up on Remark 2.3 1.), setting ξ1 ≡ ξ2 ≡ 0 and
Ξ1T = Ξ
2
T = 0 P-almost surely, our Theorem 3.1 together with Corollary 3.2
retrieves the two-player results from Carlin et al. [8, Result 1] for the case
σ = 0 and from Schied and Zhang [19, Corollary 2.6] for the case σ > 0. Note
that this configuration yields ξˆ1 ≡ ξˆ2 ≡ 0 in (14) and (15), which in turn
implies that the Nash equilibrium trading rates in (13) and the corresponding
stock holdings in (18) and (19) are deterministic.
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Following simple properties of the weight functions introduced in (12)
will help enlightening the structure of the Nash equilibrium presented in
Theorem 3.1.
Lemma 3.4. The weight functions w1, w2, w3, w4, w5 defined in (12) satisfy
1. w5· ∈ (−1, 1), w1,2,3,4· > 0 on [0, T ) and w1· +w2· +w3· +w4· = 1 on [0, T ],
2. limt↑T w
1,2
t = 1/2 and limt↑T w
3,4,5
t = 0.
Let us now discuss qualitatively the two-player Nash equilibrium obtained
in Theorem 3.1. First of all, we observe that the Nash equilibrium strate-
gies Xˆ1 and Xˆ2 of both players presented therein and in Corollary 3.2 are
symmetric in the agents’ trading targets ξ1,Ξ1T and ξ
2,Ξ2T . Moreover, very
similar to the single-player solution obtained in Bank et al. [5] it turns out
that the trading rates αˆ1 and αˆ2 in (13) prescribe, respectively, to gradually
trade in the direction of an optimal signal process ξˆ1t and ξˆ
2
t (rather than
toward the actual target position ξ1t , ξ
2
t ) which is further adjusted by a frac-
tion w5t ∈ (−1, 1) of the opponent’s respective current portfolio position Xˆ2t
and Xˆ1t . The optimal signal processes ξˆ
1 in (14) and ξˆ2 in (15) are con-
vex combinations of weighted averages of expected future target positions
of the processes ξ1, ξ2 and the expected terminal positions Ξ1T , Ξ
2
T , where
the weights w1t , w
2
t , w
3
t , w
4
t systematically shift toward the desired individual
terminal state as t ↑ T (Lemma 3.4 2.) implies that limt↑T ξˆit = ΞiT P-a.s.
for both players i = 1, 2). The increasing urgency rate (c+t + c
−
t )/(2λ) ↑ ∞
for t ↑ T , together with limt↑T w5t = 0, then forces both strategies in (13) to
wind up in the predetermined terminal portfolio position at maturity T (see
also the proof of Theorem 3.1 in Section 5 below).
Interestingly, we note that the first agent’s optimal signal process ξˆ1 not
only seeks to anticipate and average out the future evolution of her own tar-
get strategy ξ1 but, conscious of her competitor’s trading goals, does so also
for the opponent’s target strategy ξ2. In other words, besides following her
own objectives, she also takes into account the other agent’s known trad-
ing intentions. Moreover, the weights w3t and w
4
t dictate the actual trading
direction with respect to the other agent’s tracking target. Indeed, observe
that if w3t predominates w
4
t in (14), the first player’s optimal signal ξˆ
1 directs
to also trade in parallel in the same direction as the second player, that is,
in the direction of the expected future average positions of ξ2. In contrast,
if w4t outweighs w
3
t , then the optimal signal imposes to trade in the oppo-
site direction of the second player’s target strategy, i.e., toward the expected
12
weighted averages of −ξ2. Loosely speaking, the former case can be viewed
as a predatory trading action of the first agent against the second agent: By
trading in the same direction she is racing her adversary to the market in
order to benefit from more favorable prices (due to the induced price impact)
when unwinding at a later point in time the corresponding accrued position
in accordance with the known competitor’s trading needs. The latter case,
on the other hand, can be regarded as a cooperative behaviour: By trading
simultaneously in the opposite direction, she provides liquidity to her oppo-
nent. The same applies to the optimal signal ξˆ2 of the second player in (15)
due to symmetry.
In our illustrations in Section 4 below it becomes apparent that both
these cases depend on the relationship between the permanent and temporary
price impact parameters γ and λ. This is in line with the study of an optimal
liquidation problem in Scho¨neborn and Schied [23], where the authors identify
two distinct types of illiquid markets: A plastic maket where γ  λ and an
elastic market with λ  γ. They predict that competitors who are aware
of other market participants’ trading intentions engage in predatory trading
in plastic markets, while they tend to provide liquidity in elastic markets;
both in the above sense of trading in the same or opposite direction. Our
case studies in Section 4 illustrate how these two market types, plastic and
elastic, correlate accordingly with the sizes of the weights w3 and w4; we
refer to the graphical illustration in Figure 6 below (note, however, that the
dependence of the functions w3, w4 on γ and λ, as well as their interrelations
with σ and T are nontrivial). In this regard, depending on the illiquidity
parameters the optimal signal processes ξˆ1 in (14) and ξˆ2 in (15) account
for different types of regimes. It turns out that this leads to qualitative
different behavioral patterns in the Nash equilibrium of Theorem 3.1 where
both predation and cooperation between the agents can occur in a coexisting
manner (see Section 4 below). This differs remarkably from the dichotomie
in the existing literature where either predation or cooperation is observed
in equilibrium, with the latter essentially being enforced through repeating
the game or by allowing for different trading horizons among the agents as,
e.g., in Carlin et al. [8] and Scho¨neborn and Schied [23]. This is due to the
fact that the agents in the above cited work are risk-neutral and maximize
expected revenues. In contrast, in our stochastic differential price impact
game formulation in Section 2 agents are sensitive about their inventories.
This induces a form of risk-aversion which leads to a richer variety of different
behavior in equilibrium for different model parameters; see also the study of
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liquidating agents with mean-variance preferences by Schied and Zhang [19]
which is a special case of our setup.
Finally, observe that the optimal signal processes in (14) and (15) also
forecast both player’s terminal target positions Ξ1T and Ξ
2
T . However, one
can argue that w1 > w2 on [0, T ) independent of γ and λ (we refer to the
graphical illustration in Figure 6 below for simplicity). That is, regarding
the opponent’s terminal portfolio position each agent only pursues predatory
trading.
Remark 3.5 (Open-loop vs. closed-loop). Note that the open-loop Nash equi-
librium strategies in Theorem 3.1 are given in feedback form of the state
variables Xˆ1 and Xˆ2. In principle, this allows each player to react dynami-
cally to the other player’s state variable and to adapt if the opponent decides
to deviate from the equilibrium strategy. However, it does not necessarily
imply that the adapting player still reacts optimally in response to the other
player’s deviation in this case. Recall that in a closed-loop stochastic differ-
ential game solving for each player’s optimal strategy is performed over a set
of feedback policies and the other player’s strategy is likewise fixed as a de-
terministic feedback function of the random state variables; in contrast to the
general stochastic processes considered in Definition 2.2. Our solution in (13)
suggests to search for a closed-loop Nash equilibrium for our stochastic dif-
ferential game where the strategies are fixed as feedback controls of the state
variables (X1t , X
2
t ) augmented by the (uncontrolled) target positions (ξ
1
t , ξ
2
t )
(under the additional assumption that (Ft)0≤t≤T is their natural filtration).
Nonetheless, we expect that a closed-loop equilibrium does not exhibit any
new qualitative features; see also the heuristic analysis in Carlin et al. [8,
Appendix B] and the discussion in Scho¨neborn and Schied [23].
4 Illustrations
In this section we present some case studies to illustrate the qualitative be-
haviour of the two-player Nash equilibrium presented in Theorem 3.1.
4.1 Optimal liquidation revisited
We start with revisiting the differential game of optimal portfolio liquida-
tion studied in Schied and Zhang [19]. Specifically, the first agent seeks to
liquidate her initial portfolio position of x1 = 1 shares in the risky asset by
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time T = 2 and hence requires her terminal position to satisfy Ξ1T = 0 P-a.s.
at final time. Vigilant about her stock holdings and in line with her selling
intention she also wants her inventory to be close to 0 throughout by tracking
ξ1 ≡ 0 on [0, T ]. The second agent, on the contrary, does not pursue any
predetermined buying or selling objectives but solely chooses to trade in the
risky asset because she knows about the intentions of the first liquidating
agent. That is, possessing no shares at time 0 (x2 = 0) she gives herself
the constraints ξ2t = Ξ
2
T = 0 P-a.s. for all t ∈ [0, T ]. In this case, following
Theorem 3.1, we have ξˆ1 ≡ ξˆ2 ≡ 0 P-a.s. on [0, T ] in (14) and (15), and the
deterministic equilibrium trading rates of both players in (13) reduce to
αˆ1t =
c+t + c
−
t
2λ
(
−w5t Xˆ2t − Xˆ1t
)
and αˆ2t =
c+t + c
−
t
2λ
(
−w5t Xˆ1t − Xˆ2t
)
(20)
on [0, T ); cf. also the result in Schied and Zhang [19, Corollary 2.6] with
a slightly different representation. We observe in (20) that the first agent’s
portfolio position Xˆ1t is not gradually reverting towards 0 but takes the effect
of the second agent’s actions into account via the correction term −w5t Xˆ2t .
Similarly, concerning the second agent, it is optimal for her to systematically
trade in the direction of the liquidating agent’s current portfolio position Xˆ1t
weighted with w5t ∈ (−1, 1). As shown in Figure 1, this yields to predation on
the first agent in a plastic market where, e.g., γ = 2 > 1 = λ. Indeed, during
the first half of the trading period she short-sells the risky asset in parallel
to the selling of the first agent and then steadily unwinds her accrued short
position by buying back shares to become “hands-clean” by final time T .
In contrast, in an elastic market with, e.g., γ = 0.01 < 1 = λ, the Nash
equilibrium strategy dictates the second agent to cooperate with the seller
and to moderately buy almost up to one-tenth of the shares by time T/2
agent 1 is concurrently selling before starting liquidating her portfolio to
finish up with zero inventory at T . Note that the weight function w5· in (20)
flips sign depending on the market’s illiquidity regime (see also Figure 6 for a
graphical illustration of the weight functions). As a consequence, compared
to the single-player optimal liquidation strategy Xˆt = 1 +
∫ t
0
αˆsds, t ∈ [0, T ],
which satisfies
αˆt = −
√
σ
λ
coth
(√
σ
λ
(T − t)
)
Xˆt (0 ≤ t < T ) (21)
(cf., e.g., Almgren [1]), and does not depend on γ, we observe in Figure 1
that, due to the presence of the second agent’s trading activity which directly
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Figure 1: The two-player Nash equilibrium strategies Xˆ1 for the liquidating
agent 1 (green) and Xˆ2 for agent 2 (orange) on [0, T ], together with the
corresponding processes −w5Xˆ i (i = 1, 2) from the trading rates in (20)
(same-color dashed lines). The optimal single-player liquidation strategy
from (21) is depicted in black. The parameters are T = 2, σ = 1, λ = 1, as
well as γ = 2 (upper panel), γ = 0.1 (lower panel).
16
feeds into the first agent’s turnover rate αˆ1 via −w5Xˆ2 in (20), her optimal
portfolio liquidation strategy becomes more prudent in a plastic market and
slightly more aggressive in an elastic market environment. To sum up, in
equilibrium, depending on the illiquid market type, either predation or co-
operation between both agents occurs; see also the discussion in Schied and
Zhang [19, Section 3].
4.2 Piecewise constant inventory targets
The next two case studies are again simple deterministic examples but this
time with nonzero optimal signal processes ξˆ1 and ξˆ2.
In the first example, as in the optimal liquidation problem above, we
suppose that agent 2 only trades in the risky asset because of her awareness
of the trading activity of the first agent. That is, with x2 = 0 initial shares
her inventory targets are ξ2t = Ξ
2
T = 0 P-a.s. for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Concern-
ing the first agent, starting with no inventory x1 = 0 she wants to follow
a stock-buying schedule over a time period of T = 10 that prescribes to
hold one stock until time T/2 and then to double and hold her position up
to time T . Her inventory target is thus ξ1t = 1 · 1{0≤t<5} + 2 · 1{5≤t≤10} on
[0, T ] with terminal constraint Ξ1T = 2. Note that in this game setup the
optimal signal processes ξˆ1 and ξˆ2 of both agents in (14) and (15) in equi-
librium are nonzero. In particular, similar to the single-player case in Bank
et al. [5] they are anticipating and smoothing out the jump in ξ1 at time
T/2 via the averaging through the kernels K1 and K2. The associated Nash-
equilibrium trading strategies Xˆ1 and Xˆ2 from Theorem 3.1 are presented
in Figure 2. As expected from the liquidation problem above, if the market
is plastic (γ > λ) the second agent heavily preys on the first agent by trad-
ing halfway of the trading period in the same direction and buying shares.
Accordingly, in comparison to the first agent’s single-player optimal tracking
strategy from Bank et al. [5] (which does not dependent on γ) her running
after the buying-schedule ξ1 gets affected due to the presence of the preying
second agent and slightly falls behind in the second half of the trading period
(also recall the adjustment ξˆ1−w5Xˆ2 of the first agent’s optimal signal pro-
cess in her trading rate in (13)). However, if the market is elastic (λ > γ) the
second agent’s optimal behaviour in equilibrium changes. Interestingly, we
observe that her strategy turns out to be a succession of round-trips during
which she either provides liquidity to her opponent by short-selling the risky
asset like, e.g., during the first quarter of the trading period, or engages in
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Figure 2: The two-player Nash equilibrium strategies Xˆ1 for Player 1 (green)
and Xˆ2 for Player 2 (orange), together with the processes ξˆi − w5Xˆj (i 6=
j ∈ {1, 2}) from the optimal trading rates in (13) (same-color dashed lines).
The first agent’s buying programm ξ1 = 1[0,5) + 2 · 1[5,10] is plotted in grey.
For comparison, the corresponding single-player optimal tracking strategy
with associated optimal signal process from [5] is depicted in black (solid
and dashed). The parameters are T = 10, σ = 1, λ = 1, as well as γ = 2
(upper panel), γ = 0.1 (lower panel).
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predatory trading by concurrently building up some inventory in parallel to
her adversary’s buying efforts as it is the case during the second quarter of
the trading period. Thus, compared to the first agent’s single-player optimal
strategy, she suitably buys slightly faster and slower in the two-player setup.
Overall, it turns out that predation and cooperation coexist in equilibrium
in this case.
As a second example, let us examine the situation where both agents
with zero initial inventory x1 = x2 = 0 seek to gradually build up and hold a
positive fraction of the risky asset over some time period [0, T ] with T = 10.
Concretely, assume that ξ1 ≡ Ξ1T = 1 and ξ2 ≡ Ξ2T = 0.1, i.e., agent 1
wants her inventory to be close to 1 and ten times larger than the desired
inventory level of agent 2 all through the trading period [0, T ]. The associated
Nash equilibrium strategies Xˆ1 and Xˆ2 from Theorem 3.1 are presented in
Figure 3. Again, as expected from the analysis above, in a plastic market
it is optimal for agent 2 to excessively prey on the first agent who aims for
a much larger asset position by buying up to three times more shares than
her actual target inventory predetermines. In response, the acquisition of
the first agent is slowed down compared to her single-player optimal strategy
from [5]. By contrast, in an elastic market environment it turns out to be
optimal for the second agent to initially ignore her own tracking target and
to trade away from her desired inventory level in order to provide liquidity to
the higher-volume seeking first agent by short-selling some shares. Also note
how in this case the second agent’s single-player optimal tracking strategy
from [5] strongly differs from her optimal behaviour in the two-player Nash
equilibrium at the beginning of the trading period.
4.3 Running after the delta
In the final two examples we want to investigate a situation where the target
strategies ξ1 and ξ2 are adapted stochastic processes. Specifically, let us
suppose that the first agent wants to hedge an at-the-money call option with
maturity T on the underlying unaffected price process P in (3) by tracking
the corresponding frictionless (Bachelier-)delta-hedging strategy
ξ1t , Φ
(
Pt − P0√
σ(T − t)
)
(0 ≤ t ≤ T ). (22)
Here, Φ denotes the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal
distribution. We further suppose that her initial position in the risky asset
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Figure 3: The two-player Nash equilibrium strategies Xˆ1 for Player 1 (green)
and Xˆ2 for Player 2 (orange), together with the processes ξˆi − w5Xˆj (i 6=
j ∈ {1, 2}) from the optimal trading rates in (13) (same-color dashed lines).
Both agent’s inventory targets ξ1 ≡ 1 and ξ2 ≡ 0.1 are plotted in grey. For
comparison, the corresponding single-player optimal tracking strategies with
associated optimal signal processes from [5] are depicted in black (solid and
dashed). The parameters are T = 10, σ = 1, λ = 1, as well as γ = 2 (upper
panel), γ = 0.1 (lower panel).
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coincides with the frictionless delta x1 = ξ10 = 1/2 and that Ξ
1
T = 0 P-a.s., i.e.,
she wants to systematically unwind her hedging portfolio when approaching
maturity T .
Firstly, we assume that the second agent does not pursue any specific
predetermined trading objectives, that is, x2 = ξ2 = Ξ2T = 0 P-a.s. Since ξ1
in (22) is a martingale on [0, T ] the optimal signal processes ξˆ1 and ξˆ2 in (14)
and (15) simplify to
ξˆ1t = (w
3
t + w
4
t )ξ
1
t and ξˆ
2
t = (w
3
t − w4t )ξ1t (0 ≤ t ≤ T ). (23)
The Nash equilibrium strategies Xˆ1 and Xˆ2 from Theorem 3.1 are plotted in
Figure 4, together with the corresponding realisation of the delta-hedge ξ1 in
the case where the call option expires in the money. Depending on the illiq-
uidity parameters, we observe the same behavioral patterns in equilibrium as
in the deterministic cases analyzed above: In a plastic market environment,
the second agent engages in predatory trading on the first agent by trading
in parallel in the same direction of the delta-hedge. When the market is
elastic she turns into a liquidity provider instead and partially takes the op-
posite side of the hedger’s transactions. Also note that the sign of the second
agent’s optimal signal process in (23) is determined by the relation between
the weights w3 and w4, which is in turn affected by the ratio between γ and λ
(cf. also Figure 6).
Secondly, let us now assume that the second agent also hedges a one-
tenth fraction of the same call option, i.e., ξ2 = ξ1/10 (with initial and
final portfolio positions x2 = 1/20 and Ξ2T = 0 P-a.s.). The resulting Nash
equilibrium strategies from Theorem 3.1 are presented in Figure 5 where we
used the same realisation of the delta-hedge as in Figure 4. In a similar vein
as in the deterministic case above, the second agent’s optimal behaviour in
the two-player Nash equilibrium changes notably compared to her optimal
single-player frictional hedging strategy from Bank et al. [5]; focussing more
on preying on the first agent’s larger hedging portfolio in a plastic market,
or on providing liquidity to the latter in an elastic market.
5 Proofs
Inspired by Bank et al. [5] we will use tools from convex analysis and simple
calculus of variations arguments to prove our main Theorem 3.1. Indeed,
note that for any α2 ∈ A 2 fixed, the map α1 7→ J1(α1, α2) in (4) is strictly
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Figure 4: The two-player Nash equilibrium strategies Xˆ1 for Player 1
(green) and Xˆ2 for Player 2 (orange), together with the processes ξˆi−w5Xˆj
(i 6= j ∈ {1, 2}) from the optimal trading rates in (13) (same-color dashed
lines). The first agent’s frictionless delta-hedge ξ1 is plotted in grey. For
comparison, her corresponding single-player optimal hedging strategy with
associated optimal signal process from [5] is depicted in black (solid and
dashed). The parameters are T = 5, σ = 1, λ = 1, as well as γ = 2 (upper
panel), γ = 0.1 (lower panel).
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Figure 5: The two-player Nash equilibrium strategies Xˆ1 for Player 1 (green)
and Xˆ2 for Player 2 (orange), together with the processes ξˆi−w5Xˆj (i 6= j ∈
{1, 2}) from the optimal trading rates in (13) (same-color dashed lines). Only
the second agent’s frictionless delta-hedge ξ2 = ξ1/10 is plotted in grey (the
first agent’s target strategy ξ1 is the same as in Figure 4 and omitted here).
For comparison, the corresponding single-player optimal hedging strategies
of the two agents together with their associated optimal signal processes
from [5] are depicted in black (solid and dashed). The parameters are T = 5,
σ = 1, λ = 1, as well as γ = 2 (upper panel), γ = 0.1 (lower panel).
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Figure 6: Exemplary illustration of the weight functions w1, w2, w3, w4, w5
on [0, T ] defined in (12). The parameters are T = 5, σ = 1, λ = 1, as well as
γ = 2 (upper panel), γ = 0.1 (lower panel).
convex over the convex set A 1. Same holds true for the map α2 7→ J2(α1, α2)
in (5) over the convex set A 2 for any fixed α1 ∈ A 1. As a consequence, we
immediately obtain following lemma:
Lemma 5.1. There exists at most one open-loop Nash equilibrium in the
sense of Definition 2.2.
Given two controls α˜1 ∈ A 1, α˜2 ∈ A 2 we can introduce the Gaˆteaux
derivatives of the mappings α1 7→ J1(α1, α˜2) at α1 ∈ A 1 and α2 7→ J2(α˜1, α2)
24
at α2 ∈ A 2, respectively, in any directions β1, β2 ∈ A 0 , {β : β ∈
A satisfying
∫ T
0
βtdt = 0 P-a.s.}, namely,
〈∇1J1(α1, α˜2), β1〉 , lim
ε→0
J1(α1 + εβ1, α˜2)− J1(α1, α˜2)
ε
,
〈∇2J2(α˜1, α2), β2〉 , lim
ε→0
J2(α˜1, α2 + εβ2)− J2(α˜1, α2)
ε
,
allowing for following explicit expressions:
Lemma 5.2. For α1 ∈ A 1, α2 ∈ A 2 we have
〈∇1J1(α1, α2), β1〉
= E
[∫ T
0
β1s
(
λα1s +
λ
2
α2s + γ(X
2
s − x2) +
∫ T
s
(X1t − ξ1t )σdt
)
ds
]
(24)
and
〈∇2J2(α1, α2), β2〉
= E
[∫ T
0
β2s
(
λα2s +
λ
2
α1s + γ(X
1
s − x1) +
∫ T
s
(X2t − ξ2t )σdt
)
ds
]
(25)
for any β1, β2 ∈ A 0.
Proof. We only compute the Gaˆteaux derivative in (24). The same compu-
tations apply for (25). Let ε > 0 and α1 ∈ A 1, α2 ∈ A 2, β1 ∈ A 0. Note
that Xα
1+εβ1
· = X
α1
· + ε
∫ ·
0
β1sds. In fact, since
J1(α1 + εβ1, α2)− J1(α1, α2)
= εE
[∫ T
0
(
λ
2
β1t (2α
1
t + α
2
t ) +
(∫ t
0
β1sds
)
(X1t − ξ1t )σ + γβ1t (X2t − x2)
)
dt
]
+
1
2
ε2E
[∫ T
0
(
λ(β1t )
2 +
(∫ t
0
β1sds
)2
σ
)
dt
]
,
we obtain the desired result in (24) after applying Fubini’s theorem.
Having at hand the explicit expressions in (24) and (25), we can derive a
sufficient first order condition for a Nash equilibrium.
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Lemma 5.3. Suppose that (Xˆ1, Xˆ2) with controls (αˆ1, αˆ2) ∈ A 1×A 2 solves
following coupled forward backward SDE system
dX1t = α
1
tdt, X
1
0 = x
1,
dX2t = α
2
tdt, X
2
0 = x
2,
dα1t =
σ
λ
(X1t − ξ1t )dt−
γ
λ
α2tdt−
1
2
dα2t + dM
1
t , X
1
T = Ξ
1
T ,
dα2t =
σ
λ
(X2t − ξ2t )dt−
γ
λ
α1tdt−
1
2
dα1t + dM
2
t , X
2
T = Ξ
2
T ,
(26)
for two suitable square integrable martingales (M1t )0≤t<T and (M
2
t )0≤t<T .
Then (αˆ1, αˆ2) is a Nash equilibrium in the sense of Definition 2.2.
Proof. Assume that (Xˆ1, Xˆ2, αˆ1, αˆ2,M1,M2) with (αˆ1, αˆ2) ∈ A 1×A 2 solves
the FBSDE system in (26). We have to show that αˆ1 minimizes α1 7→
J1(α1, αˆ2) over A 1, and, vice versa, that αˆ2 minimizes α2 7→ J2(αˆ1, α2)
over A 2. Since we are minimizing strictly convex functionals, a sufficient
condition for the optimality of αˆ1 and αˆ2, respectively, is given by
〈∇1J1(αˆ1, αˆ2), β1〉 = 0 for all β1 ∈ A 0 (27)
and
〈∇2J2(αˆ1, αˆ2), β2〉 = 0 for all β2 ∈ A 0; (28)
cf., e.g., Ekeland and Te´mam [13].
We start with (27). By assumption, we have the representation
αˆ1t = αˆ
1
0 +
σ
λ
∫ t
0
(Xˆ1s − ξ1s )ds−
γ
λ
∫ t
0
αˆ2sds
− 1
2
(αˆ2t − αˆ20) +M1t dP⊗ dt-a.e. on Ω× [0, T )
for some square integrable martingale (M1t )0≤t<T . Moreover, since αˆ
1, αˆ2, ξ1 ∈
L2(P⊗ dt), it follows that E[∫ T
0
(M1s )
2ds] <∞. Next, introducing the square
integrable martingale
Ns , E
[∫ T
0
(Xˆ1t − ξ1t )σdt
∣∣∣∣Fs] (0 ≤ s ≤ T )
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and plugging in the above representation of αˆ1 in the Gaˆteaux in (24), we
obtain
〈∇1J1(αˆ1, αˆ2), β1〉
= E
[∫ T
0
β1s
(
λαˆ1s +
λ
2
αˆ2s + γ(Xˆ
2
s − x2) +
∫ T
s
(Xˆ1t − ξ1t )σdt
)
ds
]
= E
[∫ T
0
β1s
(
λαˆ10 +
λ
2
αˆ20 +NT + λM
1
s
)
ds
]
= E
[(
λαˆ10 +
λ
2
αˆ20 +NT
)∫ T
0
β1sds
]
+ λE
[∫ T
0
β1sM
1
s ds
]
= 0 for all β1 ∈ A 0,
where we used the result from Bank et al. [5, Lemma 5.3] in the last line.
Hence, as desired, we obtain that the first order optimality condition in (27)
is satisfied by αˆ1 ∈ A 1. In fact, the same computations apply to show
that also αˆ2 ∈ A 2 is satisfying the first order optimality condition in (28).
Therefore, we can conclude that (αˆ1, αˆ2) ∈ A 1 × A 2 is a Nash equilibrium
in the sense of Definition 2.2.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. In view of Lemma 5.3 we merely have to show that
(Xˆ1, Xˆ2, αˆ1, αˆ2) with dynamics described in Theorem 3.1, equation (13), is a
solution of the FBSDE system in (26) with some suitable square integrable
martingales (M1t )0≤t<T and (M
2
t )0≤t<T . Uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium
then follows together with Lemma 5.1.
Step 1: We start with computing the dynamics of the controls αˆ1 and αˆ2
in (13). Therefore, it is convenient to rewrite w1, w2 in (12), as well as ξˆ1
in (14) and ξˆ2 in (15) by introducing
w˜1t , (c+t + c−t )w1t , w˜2t , (c+t + c−t )w2t (0 ≤ t < T ) (29)
and
ξ˜1t , (c+t + c−t )ξˆ1t , ξ˜2t , (c+t + c−t )ξˆ2t (0 ≤ t < T ). (30)
Moreover, setting
Y +t ,
∫ t
0
(ξ1s + ξ
2
s )
2σ√
δ+
e−
γ
3λ
(T−s) sinh(
√
δ+(T − s)/(3λ))ds,
M+t , E
[
Ξ1T + Ξ
2
T + Y
+
T |Ft
] (31)
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and
Y −t ,
∫ t
0
(ξ1s − ξ2s )
2σ√
δ−
e
γ
λ
(T−s) sinh(
√
δ−(T − s)/λ)ds,
M−t , E
[
Ξ1T − Ξ2T + Y −T |Ft
] (32)
for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T , we obtain the representations
ξ˜1t = w˜
1
t (M
+
t − Y +t ) + w˜2t (M−t − Y −t ),
ξ˜2t = w˜
1
t (M
+
t − Y +t )− w˜2t (M−t − Y −t )
(0 ≤ t < T ). (33)
In particular,
ξ˜1t + ξ˜
2
t = 2w˜
1
t (M
+
t − Y +t ), ξ˜1t − ξ˜2t = 2w˜2t (M−t − Y −t ) (34)
on [0, T ). Note that Ξ1T ,Ξ
2
T , Y
+
T , Y
−
T ∈ L2(P) implies that (M+t )0≤t≤T and
(M−t )0≤t≤T are square integrable martingales. Also, observe that the pro-
cesses Y +,M+, Y −,M− ∈ L2(P⊗ dt). We can now rewrite (13) as
αˆ1t =
1
2λ
(ξ˜1t − c+t Xˆ2t + c−t Xˆ2t − c+t Xˆ1t − c−t Xˆ1t ),
αˆ2t =
1
2λ
(ξ˜2t − c+t Xˆ1t + c−t Xˆ1t − c+t Xˆ2t − c−t Xˆ2t )
(0 ≤ t < T ). (35)
Next, for w˜1, w˜2 in (29) one can easily check that
(w˜1t )
′ = w˜1t
(
1
λ
c+t −
2γ
3λ
)
, (w˜2t )
′ = w˜2t
(
1
λ
c−t +
2γ
λ
)
(0 ≤ t < T ). (36)
Hence, by applying integration by parts in (33) we obtain the dynamics
dξ˜1t = w˜
1
t (M
+
t − Y +t )
(
1
λ
c+t −
2γ
3λ
)
dt− 2
3
σ(ξ1t + ξ
2
t )dt
+ w˜2t (M
−
t − Y −t )
(
1
λ
c−t + 2
γ
λ
)
dt− 2σ(ξ1t − ξ2t )dt
+ w˜1t dM
+
t + w˜
2
t dM
−
t (0 ≤ t < T )
(37)
and
dξ˜2t = w˜
1
t (M
+
t − Y +t )
(
1
λ
c+t −
2γ
3λ
)
dt− 2
3
σ(ξ1t + ξ
2
t )dt
− w˜2t (M−t − Y −t )
(
1
λ
c−t + 2
γ
λ
)
dt− 2σ(ξ1t − ξ2t )dt
+ w˜1t dM
+
t − w˜2t dM−t (0 ≤ t < T ).
(38)
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Now, having at hand (37) and (38), as well as the fact that the functions
c+, c− in (11) satisfy the ordinary Riccati differential equations
(c+t )
′ =
(c+t )
2
λ
− 2γ
3λ
c+t −
2
3
σ, (c−t )
′ =
(c−t )
2
λ
+
2γ
λ
c−t −2σ (0 ≤ t < T ), (39)
an elementary but tedious computation reveals that the dynamics of αˆ1 and
αˆ2 in (35) on [0, T ) are given by
dαˆ1t = Xˆ
1
t
(
4σ
3λ
+
γ
3λ2
c+t −
γ
λ2
c−t
)
dt− 4σ
3λ
ξ1t dt+
γ
3λ2
ξ˜1t dt
+ Xˆ2t
(
−2σ
3λ
+
γ
3λ2
c+t +
γ
λ2
c−t
)
dt+
2σ
3λ
ξ2t dt−
2γ
3λ2
ξ˜2t dt
+
w˜1t
2λ
dM+t +
w˜2t
2λ
dM−t
(40)
and, similarly, by
dαˆ2t = Xˆ
2
t
(
4σ
3λ
+
γ
3λ2
c+t −
γ
λ2
c−t
)
dt− 4σ
3λ
ξ2t dt+
γ
3λ2
ξ˜2t dt
+ Xˆ1t
(
−2σ
3λ
+
γ
3λ2
c+t +
γ
λ2
c−t
)
dt+
2σ
3λ
ξ1t dt−
2γ
3λ2
ξ˜1t dt
+
w˜1t
2λ
dM+t −
w˜2t
2λ
dM−t ,
(41)
where we also employed the identities in (34). As a consequence, using the
representations in (35) we obtain
dαˆ1t +
1
2
dαˆ2t
=
σ
λ
(Xˆ1t − ξ1t )dt−
γ
2λ2
(ξ˜2t − c+t Xˆ1t + c−t Xˆ1t − c+t Xˆ2t − c−t Xˆ2t )dt
+
3
4λ
w˜1t dM
+
t +
1
4λ
w˜2t dM
−
t
=
σ
λ
(Xˆ1t − ξ1t )dt−
γ
λ
αˆ2tdt+
3
4λ
w˜1t dM
+
t +
1
4λ
w˜2t dM
−
t (0 ≤ t < T )
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and
dαˆ2t +
1
2
dαˆ1t
=
σ
λ
(Xˆ2t − ξ2t )dt−
γ
2λ2
(ξ˜1t − c+t Xˆ2t + c−t Xˆ2t − c+t Xˆ1t − c−t Xˆ1t )dt
+
3
4λ
w˜1t dM
+
t −
1
4λ
w˜2t dM
−
t
=
σ
λ
(Xˆ2t − ξ2t )dt−
γ
λ
αˆ1tdt+
3
4λ
w˜1t dM
+
t −
1
4λ
w˜2t dM
−
t (0 ≤ t < T ).
In other words, the pair (αˆ1, αˆ2) described in (13) satisfies the dynamics of
the FBSDE system in (26), where
∫ ·
0
w˜1t dM
+
t ,
∫ ·
0
w˜2t dM
−
t are square integrable
martingales on [0, T ) providing the ingredients for M1 and M2.
Step 2: Next, we have to check the terminal conditions of the FBSDE
system in (26), that is, limt↑T Xˆ1t = Ξ
1
T and limt↑T Xˆ
2
t = Ξ
2
T P-a.s. holds true
for the pair of solutions (Xˆ1, Xˆ2) of the coupled ODE in (13). We adopt the
argumentation from Bank et al. [5] which employs a simple comparison prin-
ciple for ordinary differential equations to our current setting. Specifically,
note that it suffices to show that
lim
t↑T
(Xˆ1t + Xˆ
2
t ) = Ξ
1
T + Ξ
2
T P-a.s. and (42)
lim
t↑T
(Xˆ1t − Xˆ2t ) = Ξ1T − Ξ2T P-a.s., (43)
where, using the dynamics in (13) and the definition of w5 in (12), the pro-
cesses Xˆ1 + Xˆ2 and Xˆ1 − Xˆ2 satisfy, respectively, the ODE
d(Xˆ1t + Xˆ
2
t ) =
c+t + c
−
t
2λ
(
ξˆ1t + ξˆ
2
t − w5t Xˆ1t − w5t Xˆ2t − Xˆ1t − Xˆ2t
)
dt
=
c+t
λ
(
ξˆ1t + ξˆ
2
t
1 + w5t
− (Xˆ1t + Xˆ2t )
)
dt (0 ≤ t < T )
(44)
and
d(Xˆ1t − Xˆ2t ) =
c+t + c
−
t
2λ
(
ξˆ1t − ξˆ2t + w5t Xˆ1t − w5t Xˆ2t − Xˆ1t + Xˆ2t
)
dt
=
c−t
λ
(
ξˆ1t − ξˆ2t
1− w5t
− (Xˆ1t − Xˆ2t )
)
dt (0 ≤ t < T ).
(45)
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Note that w5t ∈ (−1, 1) for all t ∈ [0, T ] by virtue of Lemma 3.4 1.). First,
analogously to (33) let us rewrite ξˆ1 and ξˆ2 in (14) and (15) as
ξˆ1t = w
1
t (M
+
t − Y +t ) + w2t (M−t − Y −t ),
ξˆ2t = w
1
t (M
+
t − Y +t )− w2t (M−t − Y −t )
(0 ≤ t ≤ T ) (46)
with Y +,M+, Y −,M− as defined in (31) and (32). Hence, we can consider a
ca`dla`g version of the processes (ξˆ1t )0≤t≤T and (ξˆ
2
t )0≤t≤T and obtain, together
with Lemma 3.4, 2.), the P-a.s. limits
lim
t↑T
ξˆ1t =
1
2
E[Ξ1T + Ξ2T |FT−] +
1
2
E[Ξ1T − Ξ2T |FT−] = Ξ1T and
lim
t↑T
ξˆ2t =
1
2
E[Ξ1T + Ξ2T |FT−]−
1
2
E[Ξ1T − Ξ2T |FT−] = Ξ2T
due to FT−-measurability of Ξ1T and Ξ
2
t by virtue of our assumption in (9).
In particular, since limt↑T w5t = 0 because of Lemma 3.4, 2.), it also holds
that
lim
t↑T
ξˆ1t + ξˆ
2
t
1 + w5t
= Ξ1T + Ξ
2
T and lim
t↑T
ξˆ1t − ξˆ2t
1− w5t
= Ξ1T − Ξ2T P-a.s. (47)
Let us now start with proving the limit in (42). As a consequence of (47),
for every ε > 0 there exists a (random) time τε ∈ [0, T ) such that P-a.s.
Ξ1T + Ξ
2
T − ε ≤
ξˆ1t + ξˆ
2
t
1 + w5t
≤ Ξ1T + Ξ2T + ε for all t ∈ [τε, T ). (48)
Next, define Y +,εt , Ξ1T + Ξ2T + ε− (Xˆ1t + Xˆ2t ) for all t ∈ [0, T ) so that
Y +,εt ≥
ξˆ1t + ξˆ
2
t
1 + w5t
− (Xˆ1t + Xˆ2t ) for all t ∈ [τε, T ). (49)
Together with the dynamics of Xˆ1 + Xˆ2 in (44) this yields
dY +,εt = − d(Xˆ1t + Xˆ2t ) = −
c+t
λ
(
ξˆ1t + ξˆ
2
t
1 + w5t
− (Xˆ1t + Xˆ2t )
)
dt
≥ − c
+
t
λ
Y +,εt dt on [τε, T ).
(50)
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Moreover, since for all ω ∈ Ω the linear ODE on [τε(ω), T ) given by
Z+,ετε(ω) = Y
+,ε
τε(ω)
(ω), dZ+,εt = −
c+t
λ
Z+,εt dt
admits the solution
Z+,εt = Y
+,ε
τε(ω)
(ω) · e−
∫ t
τε
c+s
λ
ds
= Y +,ετε (ω) · e−
γ
3λ
(t−τε) · sinh(
√
δ+(T − t)/(3λ))
sinh(
√
δ+(T − τε)/(3λ))
(τε ≤ t < T )
with limt↑T Z
+,ε
t = 0, the comparison principle for ODEs in (50) implies that
Y +,εt ≥ Z+,εt for all t ∈ [τε, T ) and thus
lim inf
t↑T
Y +,εt ≥ lim
t↑T
Z+,εt = 0 P-a.s.,
or, equivalently,
lim sup
t↑T
(Xˆ1t + Xˆ
2
t ) ≤ Ξ1T + Ξ2T + ε P-a.s. (51)
Next, in a similar way, set Y˜ +,εt , Ξ1T + Ξ2T − ε− (Xˆ1t + Xˆ2t ) for all t ∈ [0, T )
and observe as above from (48) that P-a.s. on [τε, T ) it holds that dY˜ +,εt ≤
− c+t
λ
Y˜ +,εt dt and hence
lim sup
t↑T
Y˜ +,εt ≤ lim
t↑T
Z+,εt ≤ 0 P-a.s.
by the comparison principle. That is,
lim inf
t↑T
(Xˆ1t + Xˆ
2
t ) ≥ Ξ1T + Ξ2T − ε P-a.s.,
which, together with (51) yields the limit in (42).
In fact, it can now be argued along the same lines as above that also the
limit in (43) holds true. Indeed, simply note that (47) implies similar to (48)
that P-a.s. for every ε > 0 there exists a (random) time τ ′ε ∈ [0, T ) such that
Ξ1T − Ξ2T − ε ≤
ξˆ1t − ξˆ2t
1− w5t
≤ Ξ1T − Ξ2T + ε for all t ∈ [τ ′ε, T ).
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Then, introduce the processes Y −,εt , Ξ1T − Ξ2T + ε− (Xˆ1t − Xˆ2t ) and Y˜ −,εt ,
Ξ1T −Ξ2T −ε− (Xˆ1t − Xˆ2t ) for all t ∈ [0, T ). By using the dynamics of Xˆ1− Xˆ2
in (45) we can once more apply the comparison principle on the interval
[τ ′ε, T ) for the ODEs of Y
−,ε and Y˜ −,ε together with the linear ODE
Z−,ετε = z ∈ R, dZ−,εt = −
c−t
λ
Z−,εt dt,
which admits the solution
Z−,εt = ze
− ∫ tτ ′ε c−sλ ds = z−e γλ (t−τε) sinh(
√
δ−(T − t)/λ)
sinh(
√
δ−(T − τ ′ε)/λ)
(τ ′ε ≤ t < T )
such that limt↑T Z
−,ε
t = 0 to finally conclude that
Ξ1T − Ξ2T − ε ≤ lim inf
t↑T
(Xˆ1t − Xˆ2t ) ≤ lim sup
t↑T
(Xˆ1t − Xˆ2t ) ≤ Ξ1T − Ξ2T + ε
as desired.
Step 3: It is left to argue that the controls αˆ1, αˆ2 described in (13) belong
to the set A in (2), i.e., αˆ1, αˆ2 ∈ L2(P⊗ dt). To achieve this we will follow a
similar strategy as in Bank et al. [5]. For simplicity, we will assume without
loss of generality that x1 = x2 = 0. Because of the coupling of αˆ1, αˆ2 in (13)
it is more convenient to prove that αˆ+ , αˆ1 + αˆ2 ∈ L2(P ⊗ dt) and αˆ− ,
αˆ1− αˆ2 ∈ L2(P⊗dt), where we set Xˆ+· ,
∫ ·
0
αˆ+s ds and Xˆ
−
· ,
∫ ·
0
αˆ−s ds. Recall
from (44) and (45) above that we then have
αˆ+t =
c+t
λ
(
ξˆ1t + ξˆ
2
t
1 + w5t
− Xˆ+t
)
, αˆ−t =
c−t
λ
(
ξˆ1t − ξˆ2t
1− w5t
− Xˆ−t
)
(52)
on [0, T ).
We start with showing that αˆ+ ∈ L2(P ⊗ dt). For this purpose, observe
that it suffices two examine following two cases separately.
Case 1.1: ξ1 ≡ ξ2 ≡ 0:
From (46) it follows that ξˆ1t + ξˆ
2
t = 2w
1
tM
+
t . Moreover, the explicit solu-
tions in (18) and (19) yield
Xˆ+t = e
− ∫ t0 c+uλ du ∫ t
0
c+s + c
−
s
λ
w1sM
+
s e
∫ s
0
c+u
λ
duds
= e
γ
3λ
(T−t) sinh(
√
δ+(T − t)/(3λ))∫ t
0
M+s
√
δ+
3λ sinh(
√
δ+(T − s)/(3λ))2ds (0 ≤ t < T ).
(53)
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Introducing the deterministic and differentiable function f+s , 1/ sinh(
√
δ+(T−
s)/(3λ)) on [0, T ) allows to rewrite the integral in (53) by applying integra-
tion by parts as∫ t
0
M+s
√
δ+
3λ sinh(
√
δ+(T − s)/(3λ))2ds =
∫ t
0
M˜+s df
+
s
= M˜+t f
+
t − M˜+0 f+0 −
∫ t
0
f+s dM˜
+
s (0 ≤ t < T ), (54)
where M˜+t , M+t / cosh(
√
δ+(T − t)/(3λ)) for all t ∈ [0, T ). Moreover, we
have that
ξˆ1t + ξˆ
2
t
1 + w5t
=
√
δ+e
γ
3λ
(T−t)
3c+t sinh(
√
δ+(T − t)/(3λ))M
+
t (0 ≤ t ≤ T ). (55)
Now, plugging back (55) and (53) together with (54) into αˆ+ in (52) yields,
after some elementary computations,
αˆ+t = −
γ
3λ
e
γ
3λ
(T−t)M˜+t +
c+t
λ
e
γ
3λ
(T−t) sinh(
√
δ+(T − t)/(3λ))M˜+0 f+0
+
c+t
λ
e
γ
3λ
(T−t) sinh(
√
δ+(T − t)/(3λ))
∫ t
0
f+s dM˜
+
s (0 ≤ t < T ).
(56)
In fact, since c+t sinh(
√
δ+(T−t)/(3λ)) is bounded on [0, T ] and M˜+ ∈ L2(P⊗
dt) (recall that M+ in (31) belongs to L2(P⊗ dt)) the first two terms in (56)
are in L2(P⊗ dt). For the stochastic integral, we obtain∫ t
0
f+s dM˜
+
s =
∫ t
0
√
δ+M˜+s
3λ cosh(
√
δ+(T − s)/(3λ)ds
+
∫ t
0
f˜+s
cosh(
√
δ+(T − s)/(3λ))dM
+
s ,
where the first integral on the right is again an element of L2(P ⊗ dt). The
34
second integral satisfies
E
∫ T
0
(∫ t
0
f˜+s
cosh(
√
δ+(T − s)/(3λ))dM
+
s
)2
dt

= E
∫ T
0
∫ t
0
(
f˜+s
cosh(
√
δ+(T − s)/(3λ))
)2
d〈M+〉sdt

= E
[∫ T
0
(T − s) (f˜
+
s )
2
cosh(
√
δ+(T − s)/(3λ))2d〈M
+〉s
]
≤ 9λ
2
δ+
E
[∫ T
0
1
T − sd〈M
+〉s
]
<∞
(57)
by our assumption in (9), where we also used Fubini’s theorem twice and the
fact that sinh(τ) ≥ τ and cosh(τ) ≥ 1 for all τ ≥ 0. That is, we obtain that
αˆ+ ∈ L2(P⊗ dt) in this case.
Case 1.2: Ξ1T = Ξ
2
T = 0:
In this case, we obtain from the expressions in (14) and (15) that
ξˆ1t + ξˆ
2
t = 2w
3
tE
[∫ T
t
(ξ1u + ξ
2
u)K
1(t, u)du
∣∣∣Ft] (0 ≤ t ≤ T )
and thus, using again the explicit representation for Xˆ+ = Xˆ1+Xˆ2 from (18)
and (19), αˆ+ in (52) becomes
αˆ+t =
c+t
λ
(
ξˆ1t + ξˆ
2
t
1 + w5t
− Xˆ+t
)
=
2c+t w
3
t
λ(1 + w5t )
E
[∫ T
t
(ξ1u + ξ
2
u)K
1(t, u)du
∣∣∣∣Ft]
− c
+
t
λ
e−
∫ t
0
c+u
λ
du∫ t
0
(c+s + c
−
s )w
3
s
λ
e
∫ s
0
c+u
λ
duE
[∫ T
s
(ξ1u + ξ
2
u)K
1(s, u)du
∣∣∣∣Fs] ds. (58)
In fact, it holds that all the ratios in (58) involving c+, c− are bounded on
[0, T ]. Moreover, by Lemma 5.4 we have
E
[∫ T
t
(ξ1u + ξ
2
u)K
1(t, u)du
∣∣∣∣Ft] ∈ L2(P⊗ dt),
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as well as
E
[∫ T
0
(∫ t
0
E
[∫ T
s
(ξ1u + ξ
2
u)K
1(s, u)du
∣∣∣∣Fs] ds)2 dt
]
≤ T
2
2
E
[∫ T
0
(
E
[∫ T
s
(ξ1u + ξ
2
u)K
1(s, u)du
∣∣∣∣Fs])2 ds
]
<∞
by using Jensen’s inequality. As a consequence, we can also conclude in this
case that αˆ+ belongs to L2(P⊗ dt).
Let us now argue that also αˆ− in (52) belongs to L2(P ⊗ dt). The argu-
mentation is very similar to the one presented above so that we only sketch
the main steps. Again, it is enough to investigate following two separate
cases.
Case 2.1: ξ1 ≡ ξ2 ≡ 0:
Similar to (53) above, using ξˆ1t −ξˆ2t = 2w2tM−t from (46) we obtain via (18)
and (19) the representation
Xˆ−t = e
− ∫ t0 c−uλ du ∫ t
0
c+s + c
−
s
λ
w2sM
−
s e
∫ s
0
c−u
λ
duds
= e−
γ
λ
(T−t) sinh(
√
δ−(T − t)/λ)∫ t
0
M−s
√
δ−
λ sinh(
√
δ−(T − s)/λ)2ds (0 ≤ t < T ).
(59)
Setting f−s , 1/ sinh(
√
δ−(T − s)/λ) on [0, T ) we can rewrite the integral
in (59) as∫ t
0
M˜−s df
−
s = M˜
−
t f
−
t − M˜−0 f−0 −
∫ t
0
f−s dM˜
−
s (0 ≤ t < T ) (60)
with M˜−t ,M−t / cosh(
√
δ−(T − t)/λ) for all t ∈ [0, T ). In addition,
ξˆ1t − ξˆ2t
1− w5t
=
√
δ−e−
γ
λ
(T−t)
c−t sinh(
√
δ−(T − t)/λ)M
−
t (0 ≤ t ≤ T ). (61)
Inserting (61) and (59) together with (60) into αˆ− in (52) then yields
αˆ−t =
γ
λ
e−
γ
λ
(T−t)M˜−t +
c−t
λ
e−
γ
λ
(T−t) sinh(
√
δ−(T − t)/λ)M˜−0 f−0
+
c−t
λ
e−
γ
λ
(T−t) sinh(
√
δ−(T − t)/λ)
∫ t
0
f−s dM˜
−
s (0 ≤ t < T ),
(62)
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where ∫ t
0
f−s dM˜
−
s =
∫ t
0
√
δ−M˜−s
λ cosh(
√
δ−(T − s)/λ)ds
+
∫ t
0
f˜−s
cosh(
√
δ−(T − s)/λ)dM
−
s . (63)
Observe as in (56) above that c−t sinh(
√
δ−(T−t)/λ) is bounded on [0, T ] and
that M˜− ∈ L2(P⊗dt). Therefore, we only need to justify that the stochastic
integral in (63) belongs to L2(P⊗ dt). Indeed, by the same computations as
in (57), we obtain via our assumption in (9) that
E
∫ T
0
(∫ t
0
f˜−s
cosh(
√
δ−(T − s)/λ)dM
−
s
)2
dt

≤ λ
2
δ−
E
[∫ T
0
1
T − sd〈M
−〉s
]
<∞.
(64)
Hence, we can conclude that αˆ− ∈ L2(P⊗ dt) in this case.
Case 2.2: Ξ1T = Ξ
2
T = 0:
Here, similar to (58) above, (14) and (15) imply that
ξˆ1t − ξˆ2t = 2w4tE
[∫ T
t
(ξ1u − ξ2u)K2(t, u)du
∣∣∣Ft] (0 ≤ t ≤ T )
and hence, together with Xˆ− = Xˆ1− Xˆ2 from (18) and (19), αˆ− in (52) can
be written as
αˆ−t =
c−t
λ
(
ξˆ1t − ξˆ2t
1− w5t
− Xˆ−t
)
=
2c−t w
4
t
λ(1− w5t )
E
[∫ T
t
(ξ1u − ξ2u)K2(t, u)du
∣∣∣∣Ft]
− c
−
t
λ
e−
∫ t
0
c−u
λ
du∫ t
0
(c+s + c
−
s )w
4
s
λ
e
∫ s
0
c−u
λ
duE
[∫ T
s
(ξ1u − ξ2u)K2(s, u)du
∣∣∣∣Fs] ds. (65)
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As in (58), all the ratios in (65) involving the functions c+, c− are bounded
on [0, T ], and we can conclude along the same lines as in step 2.1 by virtue
of Lemma 5.4 that αˆ− ∈ L2(P⊗ dt) in this case as well.
Step 4: Finally, observe that c+t > 0 and c
−
t > 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ], which
implies that w1· , w
2
· > 0 on [0, T ). Moreover, a direct computation yields that
for all t ∈ [0, T ) we have
0 <
∫ T
t
2σ√
δ+
e−
γ
3λ
(T−u) sinh(
√
δ+(T − u)/(3λ))du = w
3
t
w1t
,
0 <
∫ T
t
2σ√
δ−
e
γ
λ
(T−u) sinh(
√
δ−(T − u)/λ)du = w
4
t
w2t
.
(66)
Thus, we also obtain that w3· , w
4
· > 0 on [0, T ). But this implies for the
functions defined in (16) that K1(t, u) > 0 and K2(t, u) > 0 for all 0 ≤
t ≤ u < T , as well as that ∫ T
t
K1(t, u)du =
∫ T
t
K2(t, u)du = 1 for all
t ∈ [0, T ).
Proof of Corollary 3.2. Recall that from the dynamics of Xˆ1 and Xˆ2
in (13) we obtain that the processes Xˆ1+Xˆ2 and Xˆ1−Xˆ2 satisfy, respectively,
the linear ODEs in (44) and (45) with initial values x1 + x2 and x1 − x2.
Applying the variation of constants formula then yields
Xˆ1t ± Xˆ2t = (x1 ± x2)e−
∫ t
0
c±s
λ
ds +
∫ t
0
c+s + c
−
s
2λ
(ξˆ1s ± ξˆ2s )e−
∫ t
s
c±u
λ
duds
and hence the assertion in (18) and (19) via the obvious relation
Xˆ1,2t =
1
2
(Xˆ1t + Xˆ
2
t )±
1
2
(Xˆ1t − Xˆ2t ).
Proof of Lemma 3.4. 1. First, recall from the proof of Theorem 3.1,
Step 4, above that w1· , w
2
· , w
3
· , w
4
· > 0 on [0, T ). Moreover, from the definition
in (12) we immediately obtain that w1t + w
2
t + w
3
t + w
4
t = 1 for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Together with the fact that c+· > 0 and c
−
· > 0 on [0, T ], we also observe that
w5t ∈ (−1, 1) for all t ∈ [0, T ].
2. Concerning the limiting behaviour of the weight functions, it suffices
to note that
lim
t↑T
sinh(
√
δ+(T − t)/(3λ))
sinh(
√
δ−(T − t)/λ) =
√
δ+
3
√
δ−
.
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Then, rewriting w1, w2 in (12) by plugging in c+, c− from (11) to obtain the
representations
w1t =
√
δ+e
γ
3λ
(T−t)
d1t
, w2t =
3
√
δ−e−
γ
λ
(T−t)
d2t
with
d1t ,
√
δ+ cosh(
√
δ+(T − t)/(3λ))− 2γ sinh(
√
δ+(T − t)/(3λ))
+
√
δ− sinh(
√
δ+(T − t)/(3λ)) coth(
√
δ−(T − t)/λ),
d2t , 3
√
δ− cosh(
√
δ−(T − t)/λ)− 2γ sinh(
√
δ−(T − t)/λ)
+
√
δ+ sinh(
√
δ−(T − t)/λ) coth(
√
δ+(T − t)/(3λ))
yields
lim
t↑T
w1t =
√
δ+√
δ+ +
√
δ+
=
1
2
, lim
t↑T
w2t =
√
δ−√
δ− +
√
δ−
=
1
2
.
Similarly, with
c+t
c+t + c
−
t
=
√
δ+ coth(
√
δ+(T − t)/(3λ)) + γ√
δ+ coth(
√
δ+(T − t)/(3λ)) + 3√δ− coth(√δ−(T − t)/λ)− 2γ
c−t
c+t + c
−
t
=
3
√
δ− coth(
√
δ−(T − t)/λ)− 3γ√
δ+ coth(
√
δ+(T − t)/(3λ)) + 3√δ− coth(√δ−(T − t)/λ)− 2γ
we also have
lim
t↑T
c+t
c+t + c
−
t
=
√
δ+√
δ+ +
√
δ+
=
1
2
, lim
t↑T
c−t
c+t + c
−
t
=
√
δ−√
δ− +
√
δ−
=
1
2
and hence
lim
t↑T
w3t = lim
t↑T
w4t = lim
t↑T
w5t = 0
as desired.
The final lemma provides estimates with respect to the L2(P⊗ dt)-norm
which are used in the proof of Theorem 3.1 above.
Lemma 5.4. Let (ζt)0≤t≤T ∈ L2(P⊗ dt) be progressively measurable. More-
over, let K1(t, u), K2(t, u), 0 ≤ t ≤ u < T , denote the kernels from Theo-
rem 3.1.
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a) For ζK
1
t , E[
∫ T
t
ζuK
1(t, u)du|Ft], 0 ≤ t < T , it holds that
‖ζK1‖L2(P⊗dt) ≤ c‖ζ‖L2(P⊗dt)
for some constant c > 0.
b) For ζK
2
t , E[
∫ T
t
ζuK
2(t, u)du|Ft], 0 ≤ t < T , it holds that
‖ζK2‖L2(P⊗dt) ≤ c‖ζ‖L2(P⊗dt)
for some constant c > 0.
Proof. Both upper bounds can be verified in a similar fashion as in the proof
of Lemma 5.5 in Bank et al. [5]. We will thus omit it here.
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